

Contextual Search in the Presence of Irrational Agents

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Contextual/Feature-Based Pricing

Repeat:

Nature chooses d -dimensional context x_t

1. Product arrives with *features (location, #rooms, etc)*

2. Airbnb suggests *a price*

Learner chooses price $p_t \in \mathbb{R}$


3. User *purchases or not*

- Exists common feature value $\theta^* \in \mathbb{R}^d$.
- Agent **buys only if** context valuation above price: $\langle x_t, \theta^* \rangle \geq p_t$

4. Airbnb *observes feedback (if purchase occurred)*

Learner's feedback:
 $1\{\langle x_t, \theta^* \rangle \geq p_t\}$

5. Airbnb *collects revenue* Learner's reward: $p_t \cdot 1\{\langle x_t, \theta^* \rangle \geq p_t\}$



Set *prices* to collect as much *revenue* as possible.

Regret = Total revenue for benchmark price – Total revenue collected

Behavioral Model Core Assumption

Full Rationality

- Exists common feature value $\theta^* \in \mathbb{R}^d$.
- Agent **buys only if** their context valuation above price: $\langle x_t, \theta^* \rangle \geq p_t$

! But *sometimes* agents deviate from the prescribed behavioral model (**irrationality**)
e.g., agents **may not buy**, even if price is below their valuation, **due to their psychological state**

Problem

Model misspecifications can cause arbitrary failures to standard algorithms

Main Question

How do we design **contextual search** algorithms that are **robust** to the presence of some **irrational** agents?

Contextual Pricing for Fully Rational Agents

For round $t = 1 \dots T$:

1. Nature chooses observable context $x_t \in \mathbb{R}^d$ with $\|x_t\|_2 \leq 1$

2. Learner selects *a price* p_t

[Cohen, Lobel, Paes Leme, EC16/MS19]

[Lobel, Paes Leme, Vladu, EC17/OR18]

3. Agent makes purchase if $\langle x_t, \theta^* \rangle \geq p_t$

[Paes Leme, Schneider, FOCS18]

[Liu, Paes Leme, Schneider, SODA21]

4. Learner observes if purchase occurred (*one-sided feedback*)

5. Learner **collects revenue** if purchase occurred

$$\text{Regret} = O(d \log T)$$

$$\text{Benchmark pricing policy: } p_t^* = \langle x_t, \theta^* \rangle$$

- For **revenue** objective, [Liu, Paes Leme, Schneider, SODA21] improved to: $O(d \log \log T)$
- For $d = 1$, optimal solution due to [Kleinberg and Leighton, FOCS03]

Contextual Pricing for Adversarially Irrational Agents

Total corruption: $C = \sum_t c_t$

For round $t = 1 \dots T$:

1. Nature chooses observable context $x_t \in \mathbb{R}^d$ with $\|x_t\|_2 \leq 1$

and corruption $c_t \in \{0, 1\}$

2. Learner selects *a price* p_t

3. Agent makes purchase if $\langle x_t, \theta^* \rangle \geq p_t$ **if $c_t = 0$**

or arbitrarily if $c_t = 1$

4. Learner observes if purchase occurred (*one-sided feedback*)

5. Learner **collects revenue** if purchase occurred

Extends the corruptions model studied in:
[Lykouris, Mirrokni, Paes Leme STOC18]
[Gupta, Koren, Talwar COLT19]
[Zimmert, Seldin JMLR21]

Desiderata for our Algorithms

- ✓ Graceful degradation of regret with C
- ✓ No knowledge of C assumed (*agnostic*)

Total corruption: $C = \sum_t c_t$

Number of features: d

Main Result

Robust contextual search algorithm **agnostic** to C achieving
 $\text{Regret} \leq C \cdot d^3 \cdot (\log T)^3$ (with high probability)

[Ulam 76], [Rivest, Meyer, Kleitman, Winklmann, Spencer, JCSS80], [Karp and Kleinberg, SODA07]
For Ulam's game ($d = 1$) tight bound of $\log T + C \log C + C \log \log T$ [RMKWS, JCSS80]

Extends classical Ulam's game (aka twenty questions with a liar) in 2 ways:


1. Multidimensional
2. Agnostic to C

The Non-Robust Algorithm

[Lobel, Paes Leme, Vladu, EC17/OR18]

Multidimensional Binary Search

- Maintain active knowledge set with feasible values for θ^* .
- Set price $\langle \kappa_1, x_1 \rangle$ where κ_1 centroid of knowledge set.
- Eliminate inconsistent side of knowledge set.



Important properties of cut

1. Never eliminate θ^*
 - Retain all parameters consistent with feedback
2. Volumetric progress
 - Cut through centroid

Crucial for our result as well


Issue with Adversarial Irrationality: Ulam's Game

Challenge


How can you fix it (in high dimensions) when you know that \bar{c} responses are corrupted?

Binary search ($d = 1$)

- I fix a number $\theta^* \in [0,1]$.
- How many **queries** do you need to find it with accuracy ϵ ?



... when *one response* is corrupted?




Technical Crux: Robust Volumetric Progress

Challenge 1

We cannot repeat the same query (contexts are different at different rounds).

Context cut: hyperplane perpendicular to context



Idea 1

Keep “penalty” for each parameter & make cut once a **context cut** fully retains **protected region** on one side

- Protected region: all parameters with “penalty” $\leq \bar{c}$

Technical Crux: Robust Volumetric Progress

Challenge 2

We may never have a **context cut** with the **protected region** fully on one side.

Counterexample: Even with infinite contexts and $\bar{c} = 1$, no such **context cut**.

Technical Crux: Robust Volumetric Progress

Challenge 2

We may never have a **context cut** with the **protected region** fully on one side.

Idea 2

Combine **context cuts** to compute a “**valid cut**”.


Idea 3

Show that $2d \cdot (d + 1) \cdot \bar{c} + 1$ **context cuts** have enough information to compute **such a valid cut** (**Caratheodory's theorem**)

Counterexample: Even with infinite contexts and $\bar{c} = 1$, no such **context cut**.

Important properties of valid cut

1. Never eliminate θ^*
 - Fully retains **protected region** on one side.
2. Volumetric progress
 - Cross **close** to centroid



$d + 1$ points¹²

Technical Crux: Robust Volumetric Progress

Challenge 2

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Idea 2

Combine **context cuts** to compute a “**valid cut**”.

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
1. Never eliminate θ^*
 - Fully retains **protected region** on one side.
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Idea 4


Use Perceptron as a **witness** for finding a **valid cut**.

Perceptron as a Witness

Standard Perceptron



- Sample randomly from **ball**
- With constant probability, you will sample point from **pattern**.



Idea

If we knew them exactly + they had margin \rightarrow Perceptron \rightarrow done

- If dataset correct \rightarrow Perceptron mistakes $O\left(\frac{1}{\gamma^2}\right)$
- Else, resample

Unknown C : Layering to the Rescue!






Extension of the multi-layering race technique of [Lykouris, Mirrokni, Paes Leme, STOC18] for continuous action spaces.

Subsampling

- $\log T$ layers
- Layer i corresponds to corruption level: $C = 2^i$
- Sample a layer ℓ to play, with probability $2^{-\ell}$

Global eliminations

- Maintain consistent knowledge sets
- Below layers: more robust \rightarrow they should inform above layers.

	t_1	t_2	t_3	...
$\ell = 1$			\emptyset	
$\ell = 2$			\emptyset	
$\ell = 3$				
$\ell = 4$				

Summary

Theorem

Feature-based pricing with *adversarial irrationality*: **Regret** $\leq C \cdot d^3 \cdot (\log T)^3$

Technical crux

1. Cannot repeat same query: *Work with protected region*
2. Context cuts do not suffice: *Combine context cuts to find a valid cut*
3. Number of context cuts needed: $2d \cdot (d + 1) \cdot \bar{c} + 1$ *context cuts (Caratheodory's theorem)*
4. Computation of valid cut: *Novel use of Perceptron algorithm as "witness"*

Our multi-layering race runs parallel versions with $\bar{c} = \log T$.

Also in the paper:

1. Bounded rational agents
2. Gradient-descent based algorithm for contextual search



Thank You!